One Reason War Erupted Again Between the Americans and the British in 1812

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The origins of the War of 1812 (1812-1815), between the United States and the British Empire and its Beginning Nation allies, take been long debated. At that place were multiple factors that caused the U.s. announcement of war on Britain:^[i]

A serial of trade restrictions introduced by U.k. to impede American trade with France with which United kingdom was at war (the United states of america contested the restrictions every bit illegal under international law).^[two]
The impressment (forced recruitment) of seamen on U.s.a. vessels into the Royal Navy (the British claimed that they were British deserters).
The British military support for American Indians who were offering armed resistance to the expansion of the American borderland to the Northwest Territory.
A possible want by the U.s. to annex some or all of Canada.^[iii]
Implicit but powerful was a US motivation and desire to uphold national honour in the face of what they considered to be British insults, such equally the Chesapeake thing.^[4]

American expansion into the Northwest Territory (now Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, Illinois, Wisconsin, and northeast Minnesota) was impeded by Indian raids. Some historians maintain that an American goal in the war was to annex some or all of Canada, a view that many Canadians still share. However, many argue that inducing the fearfulness of such a seizure was merely an American tactic, which was designed to obtain a bargaining fleck.^[5]

Some members of the British Parliament^[6] and dissident American politicians such as John Randolph of Roanoke^[seven] claimed that American expansionism, rather than maritime disputes, was the primary motivation for the American declaration of war. That view has been retained by some historians.^[8]

Although the British made some concessions before the state of war on neutral trade, they insisted on the correct to reclaim their deserting sailors. The British also had long had a goal to create a large "neutral" Indian state that would cover much of Ohio, Indiana, and Michigan. They made the demand as belatedly every bit 1814 at the Ghent Peace Conference just had lost battles that would have validated those claims.^[9] ^[10]

The war was fought in iv theatres: on the oceans, where the warships and privateers of both sides preyed on each other'south merchant shipping; along the Atlantic Declension of the The states, which was blockaded with increasing severity by the British, who also mounted large-calibration raids in the subsequently stages of the war; on the long borderland, running along the Peachy Lakes and Saint Lawrence River, which separated the US from Upper Canada and Lower Canada (now Ontario and Quebec); and along the coast of the Gulf of Mexico.

During the war, both Americans and British launched invasions of each other's territory, all of which either failed or gained only temporary success. At the finish of the state of war, the British held American territory in parts of Maine and some outposts in the sparsely-populated West, and the Americans held Canadian territory about Detroit. All the same, all territories that were occupied past either side were restored at the peace treaty to the prewar borders.

In the United States, battles such as New Orleans and Baltimore, the latter of which inspired the lyrics of the Us national canticle, The Star-Spangled Imprint, produced a sense of euphoria over a Second State of war of Independence confronting Britain and ushered in an Era of Good Feelings. The partisan animosity that had one time verged on treason practically vanished.

Canada also emerged from the state of war with a heightened sense of national feeling and solidarity confronting the American invasion.

U.k., which had regarded the war as a sideshow to the Napoleonic Wars, which had raged in Europe, was less affected by the fighting, and its authorities and people welcomed an era of peaceful relations with the The states.

British goals [edit]

The British Empire was engaged in a life-and-death war against Napoleon and could not permit the Americans to help the enemy, regardless of their lawful neutral rights to do and so. Every bit Horsman explained, "If possible, England wished to avoid war with America, only not to the extent of assuasive her to hinder the British state of war effort against France. Moreover... a big section of influential British stance, both in the government and in the country, thought that America presented a threat to British maritime supremacy."^[eleven]

The British had ii goals.

Defeating Napoleon [edit]

All parties were committed to the defeat of France, which required sailors and thus impressment, as well as all-out commercial war against France, which caused the restrictions that were imposed on American merchant ships. On the question of trade with America, the British parties split. Every bit Horsman argues, "Some restrictions on neutral commerce were essential for England in this period. That this restriction took such an extreme grade after 1807 stemmed not only from the effort to defeat Napoleon, merely also from the undoubted jealousy of America's commercial prosperity that existed in England. America was unfortunate in that for most of the period from 1803 to 1812 political power in England was held by a group that was pledged not only to the defeat of France, merely also to a rigid maintenance of Britain's commercial supremacy."^[12] That group was weakened by Whigs friendly to the US in mid-1812, and the policies were reversed although the Us had already alleged war. By 1815, U.k. was no longer controlled past politicians defended to commercial supremacy then that cause had vanished.

The British were hindered by weakened diplomats in Washington, such as David Erskine, who were unable to stand for a consistent British policy, and past communications that were so tedious the Americans did not larn of the reversal of policy until they had declared war.

Americans proposed a truce based on the British ending impressment, merely the latter refused because they needed those sailors. Horsman explained, "Impressment, which was the master point of contention between England and America from 1803 to 1807, was made necessary primarily because of England's cracking shortage of seamen for the state of war against Napoleon. In a similar way the restrictions on American commerce imposed by England's Orders in Council, which were the supreme crusade of complaint betwixt 1807 and 1812, were one office of a vast commercial struggle being waged between England and France."^[12]

Creation of Indian barrier land betwixt US and Canada [edit]

The British as well had the long-standing goal of creating an Indian barrier state, a large "neutral" Indian state that would encompass most of the Old Northwest to be a barrier between the Western U.s.a. and Canada. It would exist independent of the US and under the tutelage of the British, who would use it to block American expansionism and to build up their command of the fur trade.^[13]

The British continued to brand that demand every bit late equally 1814, during the Ghent Peace Conference. All the same, they dropped the demand since their position had been weakened by the collapse of Tecumseh's Confederacy after the Battle of the Thames. Also, they simply no longer considered the goal to be worth state of war confronting the The states although much of the proposed buffer state had remained largely under British and Indian control throughout the war.^[9] ^[14]

American goals [edit]

At that place were several immediate stated causes for the American proclamation of war:

A series of merchandise restrictions, the Orders in Council (1807), were introduced by Britain to impede American trade with France, which was at state of war with Britain. The US contested those restrictions as illegal nether international law.^[2]
The impressment (forced recruitment) of US citizens into the Royal Navy.
The British military back up for American Indians, who were offering armed resistance to the U.s.a..^[3]
An unstated but powerful motivation by the Us was the need that was felt to uphold national honor in the face of British insults, such equally the Chesapeake matter.^[4]
A possible US desire to annex Canada.

British support for Indian raids [edit]

Indians based in the Northwest Territory, now united states of america of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin, had organized in opposition to American settlement and were beingness supplied with weapons by British traders in Canada. Britain was not trying to provoke a war and, at ane point, cut its allocations of gunpowder to the tribes, only it was trying to build up its fur merchandise and friendly relations with potential military allies.^[xv] Britain had ceded the area to the United States in the Treaty of Paris (1783) but had the long-term goal of creating a "neutral" or buffer Indian state in the area to block further American growth.^[16] The Indian nations more often than not followed Tenskwatawa, the Shawnee Prophet and the brother of Tecumseh. Since 1805, he had preached his vision of purifying his society by expelling the "Children of the Evil Spirit" (the American settlers).^[17]

Co-ordinate to Pratt,

There is ample proof that the British authorities did all in their ability to concur or win the allegiance of the Indians of the Northwest with the expectation of using them equally allies in the upshot of war. Indian fidelity could be held simply by gifts, and to an Indian no gift was every bit acceptable as a lethal weapon. Guns and ammunition, tomahawks and scalping knives were dealt out with some liberality by British agents.^[18] Raiding grew more common in 1810 and 1811. Westerners in Congress found the raids intolerable and wanted them to exist permanently ended.^[xix] ^[20]

American expansionism [edit]

Historians accept considered the idea that American expansionism was one cause of the war. The American expansion into the Northwest Territory (now Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin) was being blocked by Indians, which was a major crusade animating the Westerners. The American historian Walter Nugent, in his history of American expansionism, argues that expansion into the Midwest "was not the merely American objective, and indeed not the immediate one surface area but it was an objective."^[21]

Annexation [edit]

More than controversial is whether an American state of war goal was to acquire Canadian lands, especially what is now Western Ontario, permanently or whether it was planned to seize the surface area temporarily as a bargaining chip. The American desire for Canada has been a staple in Canadian public opinion since the 1830s and was much discussed amid historians earlier 1940 only has since become less popular. The idea was first developed by the Marxist historian Louis K. Hacker and refined by the diplomatic specialist Julius Pratt.^[22]

In 1925, Pratt argued that Western Americans were incited to war by the prospect of seizing Canada.^[23] Pratt's argument supported the conventionalities of many Canadians, especially in Ontario, where fear of American expansionism was a major political element, and the notion still survives among Canadians.^[24]

In 2010, the American historian Alan Taylor examined the political dimension of the annexation issue as Congress debated whether to declare war in 1811 and 1812. The Federalist Party was strongly opposed to war and to looting, as were the Northeastern states. The majority in Congress was held by the Democratic-Republican Political party, which was split on the issue. I faction wanted the permanent expulsion of Britain and the annexation of Canada. John Randolph of Roanoke, representing Virginia, commented, "Agrarian greed not maritime correct urges this war. Nosotros accept heard simply i word - like the whipporwill'southward one monotonous tone: Canada! Canada! Canada!"^[25]

The other faction, based in the South, said that acquiring new territory in the Due north would give it too much power and and so opposed the incorporation of Canada since its Catholic population was viewed as "unfit past faith, language and illiteracy for republican citizenship." The Senate held a series of debates and twice voted on proposals that explicitly endorsed looting, neither of which passed. Notwithstanding, the second failed just because of a proviso stating that Canada could be returned to British rule after information technology had been annexed. State of war was declared with no mention of annexation, but widespread support existed amid the State of war Hawks for it. Some Southerners supported expansionism; Tennessee Senator Felix Grundy considered it essential to acquire Canada to preserve domestic political balance and argued that annexing Canada would maintain the free state-slave land balance, which might otherwise be ended by the acquisition of Florida and the settlement of the southern areas of the new Louisiana Purchase.^[26]

Fifty-fifty James Monroe and Henry Dirt, key officials in the authorities, expected to gain at to the lowest degree Upper Canada from a successful state of war.

American commanders like General William Hull and Alexander Smythe issued proclamations to Canadians and their troops that assured them that annexations would actually occur during the war. Smythe wrote to his troops that when they entered Canada, "You enter a country that is to go one with the The states. You volition get in amongst a people who are to get your fellow-citizens."^[27]

Seizing Canada as bargaining chip [edit]

Historians now by and large agree that an invasion and seizure of Canada was the primary American armed forces strategy once the state of war had begun. With British control of the oceans, there was no other manner to fight against British interests actively. President James Madison believed that food supplies from Canada were essential to the British overseas empire in the Westward Indies and that an American seizure would be an fantabulous bargaining chip at the peace conference. During the state of war, some Americans speculated that they might equally well proceed all of Canada. Thomas Jefferson, for example, was now out of power but argued that the expulsion of British interests from nearby Canada would remove a long-term threat to American republicanism.

The New Zealander historian J.C.A. Stagg argued that Madison and his advisers believed that the conquest of Canada would be easy and that economic coercion would force the British to come to terms by cut off the food supply for their highly-valuable Westward Indies sugar colonies. Furthermore, the possession of Canada would be a valuable bargaining fleck. Stagg suggested that frontiersmen demanded the seizure of Canada not because they wanted the land, since they had plenty of it, but because the British were thought to be arming the Indians and thus blocked settlement of the West.^[28]

Every bit Horsman concluded, "The idea of conquering Canada had been nowadays since at least 1807 as a ways of forcing England to modify her policy at sea. The conquest of Canada was primarily a means of waging war, not a reason for starting it."^[29] Hickey flatly stated, "The want to annex Canada did not bring on the war."^[thirty] Brown (1964) ended, "The purpose of the Canadian trek was to serve negotiation not to annex Canada."^[31]

Burt, a Canadian scholar only besides a professor at an American university, agreed completely by noting that Foster, the British minister to Washington, likewise rejected the argument that annexation of Canada was a war goal.^[32] Yet, Foster likewise rejected the possibility of a declaration of war just had dinner with several of the more prominent State of war Hawks and and so his sentence on such matters tin be questioned.

However, Stagg stated that "had the War 1812 been a successful military venture, the Madison administration would take been reluctant to have returned occupied Canadian territory to the enemy."^[33] Other authors concord, with one stating, "Expansion was non the merely American objective, and indeed not the firsthand one. Simply information technology was an objective."^[34]

"The American yearning to blot Canada was long-standing.... In 1812 it became part of a grand strategy."^[35]

Another suggested, "Americans harbored 'manifest destiny' ideas of Canadian looting throughout the nineteenth century." ^[36] A third stated, "The [American] belief that the Usa would one day annex Canada had a continuous existence from the early days of the War of Independence to the War of 1812 [and] was a cistron of primary importance in bringing on the war."^[37]

Another stated that "acquiring Canada would satisfy America's expansionist desires"^[38]

The historian Spencer Tucker wrote, "War Hawks were eager to wage war with the British, not only to finish Indian depredations in the Midwest just besides to seize Canada and possibly Spanish Florida."^[39]

Inhabitants of Ontario [edit]

Nearly of the inhabitants of Upper Canada (now Ontario) were Americans, but some of them were exiled United Empire Loyalists, and nigh of them were recent immigrants. The Loyalists were extremely hostile to American annexation, and the other settlers seem to have been uninterested and to take remained neutral during the state of war. The Canadian colonies were thinly populated and only lightly defended by the British Regular army, and some Americans believed that the many in Upper Canada would ascension and greet the American invading army every bit liberators.^[40] The combination implied an piece of cake conquest. Once the war began, ex-President Thomas Jefferson warned that the British presence posed a grave threat and pointed to "The infamous intrigues of Great Britain to destroy our authorities... and with the Indians to Tomahawk our women and children, prove that the cession of Canada, their fulcrum for these Machiavellian levers, must be a sine qua not at a treaty of peace." He predicted in late 1812 that "the acquisition of Canada this year, every bit far every bit the neighborhood of Quebec, will exist a mere matter of marching, and will give the states the experience for the attack on Halifax, the side by side and terminal expulsion of England from the American continent."^[41]

Maass argued in 2015 that the expansionist theme is a myth that goes against the "relative consensus amongst experts that the primary U.S. objective was the repeal of British maritime restrictions." He argued the consensus among scholars to exist that the US went to war "because six years of economic sanctions had failed to bring Britain to the negotiating table, and threatening the Royal Navy's Canadian supply base was their concluding hope." However, he likewise noted that many historians even so published expansionism every bit a crusade and that fifty-fifty those against the thought even so included caveats regarding "possible expansionism underlying US motives." Maass agreed that theoretically, expansionism might take tempted Americans, only he also found that "leaders feared the domestic political consequences of doing so. Notably, what limited expansionism there was focused on sparsely populated western lands rather than the more than populous eastern settlements [of Canada]."^[42]

Violations of United states rights [edit]

The long wars between Great britain and France (1793–1815) led to repeated complaints past the US that both powers violated American rights, as a neutral power, to trade with both sides. Furthermore, Americans complained loudly that British agents in Canada were supplying munitions to hostile Native American tribes living in US territories.

In the mid-1790s, the Royal Navy, short of manpower, began to board American merchant ships to seize American and British sailors from American vessels. Although the policy of impressment was supposed to repossess simply British subjects, the police force of Britain and about other countries defined nationality by nativity. However, American law allowed individuals who had been resident in the country for some time to prefer United states citizenship. Therefore, many individuals were British by British law but American by American law. The defoliation was compounded by the refusal of Jefferson and Madison to issue any official citizenship documents. Their position was that all persons serving on American ships were to be regarded equally US citizens and and then no further evidence was required. That opinion was motivated past the communication of Albert Gallatin, who had calculated that half of the US deep-sea merchant seamen (ix,000 men) were British subjects. Allowing the Royal Navy to repossess those men would destroy both the Us economy and the government's vital community revenue.^[43] Any sort of accommodation would jeopardize those men and so concords such as the proposed Monroe-Pinkney Treaty (1806) betwixt the US and Britain were rejected by Jefferson.

To make full the need for some sort of identification, Usa consuls provided unofficial papers. However, they relied on unverifiable declarations by the individual concerned for evidence of citizenship, and the large fees paid for the documents made them a lucrative sideline. In plough, British officers, who were short of personnel and convinced, somewhat reasonably, that the American flag was covering a large number of British deserters, tended to treat such papers with scorn. Between 1806 and 1812, nearly 6,000 seamen were impressed and taken against their will into the Royal Navy;^[44] 3,800 of them were afterward released.^[45]

Honor [edit]

A number of American contemporaries chosen it "the "2d War for Independence."^[46] Henry Clay and John C. Calhoun pushed a announcement of state of war through Congress by stressing the need to uphold American honor and independence. Speaking of his swain Southerners, Calhoun told Congress that they

are not prepared for the colonial state to which over again that Ability [United kingdom of great britain and northern ireland] is endeavoring to reduce us. The manly spirit of that section of our country volition not submit to be regulated past any strange Power.^[47]

The historian Norman Risjord emphasized the fundamental importance of laurels as a crusade the war.^[48] Americans of every political stripe saw the need to uphold national honour and to reject the treatment of the United States by Britain every bit a third-class nonentity. Americans talked incessantly near the need for force in response.^[49] That quest for honor was a major cause of the state of war in the sense that most Americans who were not involved in mercantile interests or threatened by Indian attack strongly endorsed the preservation of national honor.^[50]

The humiliating attack past HMS Leopard against USS Chesapeake in June 1807 was a decisive event.^[51] ^[52] Many Americans called for war, simply Jefferson held back and insisted that economical warfar would prove more than successful, which he initiated, specially in the form of embargoing or refusing to sell products to Britain. The policy proved a failure by not deterring the British, simply it seriously damaged American industry and alienated the mercantile cities of the Northeast, which were seriously hurt.

Historians have demonstrated the powerful motive of accolade to shape public opinion in a number of states, including Massachusetts,^[53] Ohio,^[54] Pennsylvania,^[55] ^[56] Tennessee,^[57] and Virginia,^[58] too as the territory of Michigan.^[59] On 3 June 1812, the Firm Committee on Strange Diplomacy, chaired past the pro-state of war extremist John C. Calhoun, called for a declaration of war in ringing phrases past denouncing Britain's "animalism for power," "unbounded tyranny," and "mad ambition." James Roark wrote, "These were fighting words in a war that was in large measure out about insult and honor."^[60] Calhoun reaped much of the credit.^[61]

In terms of honor, the decision of the war, peculiarly the spectacular defeat of the principal British invasion army at New Orleans, restored the American sense of honor. The historian Lance Banning wrote:

National laurels, the reputation of republican regime, and the continuing supremacy of the Republican political party had seemed to be at pale.... National accolade had [at present] been satisfied.... Americans celebrated the terminate of the struggle with a brilliant burst of national pride. They felt that they had fought a second war for independence, and had won. If trivial had been gained, nothing had been lost in a contest the greatest royal power on the globe.^[62]

According to J.C.A. Stagg, a historian from New Zealand,

Initially, in the studies of Norman Risjord, these values were described as an outrageous sense of "national honor" provoked by the deport of Great Britain toward the U.s.a. on the high seas, just in the work of Roger Dark-brown, concerns most "national honor" became part of a larger commitment to "republicanism" itself—both in the institution of the ruling Jeffersonian Republican Party and in the belief that republicanism as a national creed would exist in jeopardy unless Americans made another effort to vindicate the independence that had supposedly been won in 1783.^[63]

U.s. economic motivations [edit]

The failure of Jefferson's embargo and of Madison's economic coercion, according to Horsman, "made war or absolute submission to England the only alternatives, and the latter presented more than terrors to the recent colonists. The war hawks came from the West and the South, regions that had supported economic warfare and were suffering the most from British restrictions at sea. The merchants of New England earned large profits from the wartime carrying trade, in spite of the numerous captures by both France and England, only the western and southern farmers, who looked longingly at the consign market, were suffering a depression that fabricated them demand war."^[64]

Prewar incidents [edit]

This dispute came to the forefront with the Chesapeake–Leopard affair of 1807, when the British warship HMS Leopard fired on and boarded the American warship USS Chesapeake, killed three, and carried off iv deserters from the Majestic Navy. (Only one was a British denizen and was subsequently hanged; the other three were American citizens and were after returned but the last ii only in 1812.) The American public was outraged past the incident, and many called for war to assert American sovereignty and national laurels.

The Chesapeake–Leopard affair followed closely on the similar Leander affair, which had resulted in Jefferson banning sure British warships and their captains from American ports and waters. Whether in response to that incident or the Chesapeake-Leopard affair, Jefferson banned all foreign armed vessels from American waters except for those begetting dispatches. In December 1808, an American officeholder expelled HMS Sandwich from Savannah, Georgia; the schooner had entered with dispatches for the British consul at that place.

Meanwhile, Napoleon'southward Continental Organisation and the British Orders in Council established embargoes that fabricated international trade precarious. From 1807 to 1812, most 900 American ships were seized equally a issue.^[65] The US responded with the Embargo Act of 1807, which prohibited American ships from sailing to whatsoever foreign ports and closed American ports to British ships. Jefferson's embargo was specially unpopular in New England, whose merchants preferred the indignities of impressment to the halting of overseas commerce. The discontent contributed to the calling of the Hartford Convention in 1814.

The Embargo Deed had no effect on either Great britain or French republic then was replaced by the Not-Intercourse Deed of 1809, which lifted all embargoes on American aircraft except for those jump for British or French ports. As that proved to be unenforceable, it was replaced in 1810 by Macon's Beak Number 2, which lifted all embargoes merely offered that if French republic or Uk ceased its interference with American shipping, the US would reinstate an embargo on the other nation. Napoleon, seeing an opportunity to make trouble for Britain, promised to leave American ships solitary, and the US reinstated the embargo with Britain and moved closer to declaring war. However, he had no intention of honoring his promise.^[66]

Exacerbating the state of affairs, Sauk Indians, who controlled trade on the Upper Mississippi, were displeased with the US government afterward the 1804 treaty between Quashquame and William Henry Harrison ceded Sauk territory in Illinois and Missouri to the The states. The Sauk felt the treaty to be unjust and that Quashquame had been unauthorized to sign abroad land and had been unaware of what he was signing. The institution of Fort Madison in 1808 on the Mississippi had further angered the Sauk and led many, including Black Hawk, to side with the British before the war bankrupt out. Sauk and allied Indians, including the Ho-Chunk (Winnebago), were very effective fighters for the British on the Mississippi and helped to defeat Fort Madison and Fort McKay in Prairie du Chien.

The Oxford historian Paul Langford looked at the decisions by the British regime in 1812:

The British ambassador in Washington [Erskine] brought diplomacy about to an accommodation, and was ultimately disappointed not by American intransigence just by ane of the outstanding diplomatic blunders fabricated by a Foreign Secretary. It was Canning who, in his most irresponsible manner and evidently out of sheer dislike of everything American, recalled the ambassador Erskine and wrecked the negotiations, a slice of most complimentary folly. As a consequence, the possibility of a new embarrassment for Napoleon turned into the certainty of a much more serious ane for his enemy. Though the British cabinet eventually made the necessary concessions on the score of the Orders-in-Quango, in response to the pressures of industrial lobbying at home, its activity came too tardily.... The loss of the North American markets could have been a decisive blow. As it was by the time the United states declared state of war, the Continental System [of Napoleon] was outset to crack, and the danger correspondingly diminishing. All the same, the war, inconclusive though information technology proved in a military sense, was an irksome and expensive embarrassment which British statesman could have done much more to avert.^[67]

Declaration of war [edit]

In the US Firm of Representatives, a group of young Democratic-Republicans, known as the "War Hawks," came to the forefront in 1811 and were led past Speaker Henry Dirt of Kentucky and past John C. Calhoun of S Carolina. They advocated going to war against Britain for all of the reasons listed higher up but concentrated on their grievances more than on territorial expansion.

On 1 June 1812, President James Madison gave a speech to the US Congress that recounted American grievances confronting Britain but did not specifically call for a declaration of war. Afterwards Madison'due south speech, the House of Representatives quickly voted (79 to 49) to declare state of war, and the Senate did the aforementioned by xix to 13. The disharmonize formally began on 18 June 1812, when Madison signed the measure into law. It was the first fourth dimension that the Usa had declared war on another nation, and the congressional vote was the closest-ever vote to declare state of war in American history. None of the 39 Federalists in Congress voted for the war, whose critics afterwards referred to information technology every bit "Mr. Madison'southward State of war." ^[68]

See likewise [edit]

Chronology of the War of 1812
Presidency of Thomas Jefferson
Presidency of James Madison
Opposition to the State of war of 1812
Results of the War of 1812
War of 1812
War of 1812 bibliography

References [edit]

^ Jasper K. Trautsch, "The Causes of the War of 1812: 200 Years of Debate," Journal of Military History (Jan 2013) 77#1 pp. 273-293.
^ ^a ^b Caffery, pp. 56–58
^ ^a ^b Caffery, pp. 101–104
^ ^a ^b Norman G. Risjord, "1812: Conservatives, State of war Hawks, and the Nation'due south Laurels." William And Mary Quarterly 1961 18(2): 196–210. in JSTOR
^ Bowler, pp. 11–32
^ George Canning, Address respecting the war with America, Hansard (Firm of Commons), eighteen February 1813
^ Fregosi, Paul (1989). Dreams of Empire. Hutchinson. p. 328. ISBN0-09-173926-eight.
^ J. C. A. Stagg (1983), Mr Madison's War, p. 4
^ ^a ^b Dwight L. Smith, "A North American Neutral Indian Zone: Persistence of a British Thought" Northwest Ohio Quarterly 1989 61(2–four): 46–63
^ Francis Chiliad. Carroll, A Adept and Wise Measure: The Search for the Canadian-American Boundary, 1783–1842, 2001, p. 23
^ Horsman (1962) p. 264
^ ^a ^b Horsman (1962) p. 265
^ Dwight L. Smith"A North American Neutral Indian Zone: Persistence of a British Thought." Northwest Ohio Quarterly 61#2-4 (1989): 46-63.
^ Francis M. Carroll (2001). A Good and Wise Measure: The Search for the Canadian-American Purlieus, 1783-1842 . U. of Toronto Press. p. 24.
^ Mark Zuehlke, For Accolade'southward Sake: The War of 1812 and the Brokering of an Uneasy Peace (2006) pp. 62–62
^ Dwight 50. Smith, "A Northward American Neutral Indian Zone: Persistence of a British Thought", Northwest Ohio Quarterly (1989) 61 (ii–4): 46–63.
^ Timothy D. Willig. Restoring the Chain of Friendship: British Policy and the Indians of the Bang-up Lakes, 1783–1815 (2008) p. 207.
^ Julius W. Pratt, A history of U.s. strange-policy (1955) p 126
^ David South. Heidler and Jeanne T. Heidler, eds. Encyclopedia of the War of 1812 (1997) pp. 253, 504
^ Zuehlke, For Honor's Sake, p 62
^ Walter Nugent, Habits of Empire: A History of American Expansionism (2009), ch. iii, quoted on p. 73.
^ Hacker (1924); Pratt (1925). Goodman (1941) refuted the idea, and even Pratt gave it up. Pratt (1955)
^ Julius W. Pratt, "Western Aims in the War of 1812." The Mississippi Valley Historical Review (1925): 36-50. in JSTOR
^ W. Arthur Bowler, "Propaganda in Upper Canada in the War of 1812," American Review of Canadian Studies (1988) 28:eleven–32; C.P. Stacey, "The War of 1812 in Canadian History" in Morris Zaslow and Wesley B. Turner, eds. The Defended Border: Upper Canada and the War of 1812 (Toronto, 1964)
^ Fregosi 1989, p. 328.
^ John Roderick Heller (2010). Commonwealth's Lawyer: Felix Grundy of the Quondam Southwest. p. 98.
^ Alan Taylor, The Civil War of 1812: American Citizens, British Subjects, Irish Rebels, & Indian Allies (2010) pp. 137-xl.
^ Stagg (1983)
^ Horsman (1962) p. 267
^ Hickey (1990) p. 72.
^ Brown p. 128.
^ Burt (1940) pp. 305–310.
^ Stagg 1983, p. 4. sfn error: no target: CITEREFStagg1983 (help)
^ Nugent, p. 73. sfn mistake: no target: CITEREFNugent (help)
^ Nugent, p. 75. sfn mistake: no target: CITEREFNugent (help)
^ Carlisle & Golson 2007, p. 44. sfn error: no target: CITEREFCarlisleGolson2007 (assist)
^ Pratt 1925, p.^{[ page needed ]}. sfn mistake: no target: CITEREFPratt1925 (assistance)
^ David Heidler,Jeanne T. Heidler, The War of 1812, pg4^{[ total commendation needed ]}
^ Tucker 2011, p. 236. sfn error: no target: CITEREFTucker2011 (help)
^ Fred Landon, Western Ontario and the American Frontier (1941) pp 12–22
^ James Laxer (2012). Tecumseh and Brock: The War of 1812. p. 129.
^ Richard W. Maass, "Difficult to Relinquish Territory Which Had Been Conquered": Expansionism and the War of 1812," Diplomatic History (January 2015) 39#1 pp 70-97 doi: 10.1093/dh/dht132 Abstract Online
^ Rodger, Control of the Bounding main, p565
^ Hickey (1989) p. 11
^ Rodger, Command of the Body of water, p566
^ Eric Foner, Give Me Liberty (2008) vol 1 p 270.
^ William M. Meigs, The Life of John Caldwell Calhoun (1917) one:126.
^ Norman Thou. Risjord, "1812: Conservatives, State of war Hawks and the Nation'due south Honor." William and Mary Quarterly: A Magazine of Early American History (1961): 196-210. in JSTOR
^ Robert 50. Ivie, "The metaphor of strength in prowar discourse: The case of 1812." Quarterly Journal of Speech 68#3 (1982) pp: 240-253.
^ Bradford Perkins, The causes of the State of war of 1812: National honor or national interest? (1962).
^ Spencer Tucker and Frank T. Reuter, Injured Award: The Chesapeake-Leopard Affair, 22 June 1807 (Naval Constitute Press, 1996)
^ Meet likewise Jonathon Hooks, "Redeemed Honor: The President‐Little Belt Affair and the Coming of the War of 1812." Historian 74.1 (2012): 1-24 online.
^ William Barlow and David O. Powell. "Congressman Ezekiel Salary of Massachusetts and the Coming of the War of 1812." Historical Journal of Massachusetts 6#two (1978): 28.
^ William R. Barlow, "Ohio's Congressmen and the State of war of 1812." Ohio History 72 (1963): 175-94.
^ Victor Sapio, Pennsylvania and the State of war of 1812 (University Press of Kentucky, 2015)
^ Martin Kaufman, "State of war Sentiment in Western Pennsylvania: 1812." Pennsylvania History (1964): 436-448.
^ William A. Walker, "Martial Sons: Tennessee Enthusiasm for the State of war of 1812." Tennessee Historical Quarterly twenty.1 (1961): 20+
^ Edwin Yard. Gaines, "The Chesapeake Thing: Virginians Mobilize to Defend National Accolade." The Virginia Mag of History and Biography (1956): 131-142.
^ William Barlow, "The Coming of the State of war of 1812 in Michigan Territory." Michigan History 53 (1969): 91-107.
^ James L. Roark; Patricia Cline Cohen; et al. (2011). Understanding the American Promise. p. 259.
^ James H. Ellis (2009). A Ruinous and Unhappy War: New England and the War of 1812. Algora Publishing. pp. 75–76.
^ Lance Banning (1980). The Jeffersonian Persuasion: Evolution of a Party Ideology. Cornell Upwards. p. 295.
^ J.C.A. Stagg, The war of 1812: Conflict for a Continent (2012) p. vi.
^ Horsman (1962) p. 266
^ Hickey (1989) p. 19
^ Hickey, p. 22; Horsman, p. 188.
^ Paul Langford, Modern British Foreign Policy: The Eighteenth Century: 1688-1815 (1976) p 228
^ Journal of the Senate of the U.s. of America, 1789–1873

Sources [edit]

Adams, Henry. History of the United States during the Administrations of James Madison (v vol 1890–91; ii vol Library of America, 1986). ISBN 0-940450-35-6 Table of contents, the archetype political-diplomatic history
Benn, Carl. The War of 1812 (2003).
Brown, Roger H. The Republic in Peril: 1812 (1964). on American politics
Burt, Alfred L. The United states, Nifty United kingdom, and British North America from the Revolution to the Establishment of Peace after the War of 1812. (1940)
Goodman, Warren H. "The Origins of the War of 1812: A Survey of Irresolute Interpretations," Mississippi Valley Historical Review (1941)28#1 pp 171–86. in JSTOR
Hacker, Louis K. "Western Country Hunger and the State of war of 1812," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, (1924), 10#three pp 365–95. in JSTOR
Heidler, Donald & J, (eds) Encyclopedia of the War of 1812 (2004) articles by 70 scholars from several countries
Hickey, Donald. The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict. University of Illinois Press, 1989. ISBN 0-252-06059-8, past leading American scholar
Hickey, Donald R. Don't Give up the Ship! Myths of the War of 1812. (2006) ISBN 0-252-03179-2
Hickey, Donald R. ed. The State of war of 1812 : writings from America'south second war of independence (2013), primary sources online free to borrow
Horsman, Reginald. The Causes of the War of 1812 (1962).
Kaplan, Lawrence S. "French republic and Madison's Decision for War 1812," The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, Vol. 50, No. 4. (Mar., 1964), pp. 652–671. in JSTOR
Maass, Richard Westward. "'Hard to Relinquish Territory Which Had Been Conquered': Expansionism and the War of 1812," Diplomatic History (Jan 2015) 39#1 pp seventy–97 doi: ten.1093/dh/dht132
Perkins, Bradford. Prologue to war: England and the Usa, 1805–1812 (1961) full text online costless, detailed diplomatic history by American scholar
Perkins, Bradford. Castlereagh and Adams: England and the United states, 1812·1823 (1964) excerpt; online review
Perkins, Bradford. (1962). The causes of the War of 1812. National honor or national involvement?" online gratuitous to borrow
Pratt, Julius Due west. A History of United States Strange Policy (1955)
Pratt, Julius W. (1925b.) Expansionists of 1812
Pratt, Julius Due west. "Western War Aims in the War of 1812," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 12 (June, 1925), 36–fifty. in JSTOR
Risjord, Norman K. "1812: Conservatives, State of war Hawks, and the Nation's Accolade," William and Mary Quarterly, 18#ii ( 1961), 196–210. in JSTOR
Smelser, Marshall. The Democratic Republic 1801–1815 (1968) general survey of American politics & diplomacy
Stagg, John C. A. Mr. Madison'due south War: Politics, Diplomacy, and Warfare in the Early American republic, 1783–1830. (1983), major overview (by New Zealand scholar)
Stagg, John C. A. "James Madison and the 'Malcontents': The Political Origins of the War of 1812," William and Mary Quarterly (Oct., 1976) in JSTOR
Stagg, John C. A. "James Madison and the Coercion of U.k.: Canada, the West Indies, and the State of war of 1812," in The William and Mary Quarterly (January., 1981) in JSTOR
Steel, Anthony. "Anthony Merry and the Anglo-American Dispute near Impressment, 1803-vi." Cambridge Historical Journal 9#3 (1949): 331-51 online.
Taylor, Alan. The Civil War of 1812: American Citizens, British Subjects, Irish Rebels, & Indian Allies (2010)
Taylor, George Rogers, ed. The War of 1812: Past Justifications and Present Interpretations (1963) online costless
Trautsch, Jasper Thou. "The Causes of the War of 1812: 200 Years of Debate," Journal of Military History (Jan 2013) 77#i pp 273–293
Updyke, Frank A. The diplomacy of the War of 1812 (1915) online costless

External links [edit]

Reading list on the Causes of the War of 1812 compiled past the United states of america Army Center of Military History

kellyticiss.blogspot.com

Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Origins_of_the_War_of_1812